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 Smart grid investments can beneﬁt municipal economic development.
 Drawing on urban political economy we describe these values.
 New values alter the smart grid investment problem.
 New integration of urban policy and DNOs are proposed by this research.
 Socio-technical approaches are enhanced by urban political economy and vice versa.
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a b s t r a c t
Investing in smart grid infrastructure is a key enabler for the transition to low carbon energy systems.
Recent work has characterised the costs and beneﬁts of individual “smart” investments. The political
economy of the UK electricity system, however, has co-evolved such that there is a mismatch between
where beneﬁts accrue and where costs are incurred, leading to a problem of value capture and
redeployment. Further, some beneﬁts of smart grids are less easy to price directly and can be classiﬁed as
public goods, such as energy security and decarbonisation. This paper builds on systemic treatments of
energy system transitions to characterise the co-evolution of value capture and structural incentives in
the electricity distribution system, drawing on semi-structured interviews and focus groups undertaken
with smart grid stakeholders in the UK. This leads to an identiﬁcation of municipal scale values that may
be important for business models for the delivery of smart infrastructure. Municipalities may thus
pursue speciﬁc economic opportunities through smart grid investment. This supports recent practical
interest in an expanded role for municipalities as partners and investors in smart grid infrastructures.
& 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/).
1. Introduction
“.....the inherent economic viability and wealth of a city is
intrinsically linked to its capacity to supply heat and power and
the infrastructure, whether that's roads, telecommunications or
energy infrastructure....” (Interviewee, 2014).
Whilst there is no universal deﬁnition of what makes an
electricity distribution grid “smart”, Xenias et al. (2014) deﬁne
the main features of a smart grid as an energy network that can:
manage embedded suppliers, communicate between the produ-
cers and users of electricity, utilise ICT to respond to and manage
demand, and ensure safe and secure electricity distribution.
Current electricity distribution networks in the UK do not incor-
porate these features and so (save some demonstration projects)
may still be regarded as forming “dumb” grids that are maintained
to accommodate one way power ﬂow and ensure security of
supply (Balta-Ozkan et al., 2014).
Smart Grids form a key part of the transition to low carbon
energy systems. The UK's energy regulator Ofgem has estimated
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that meeting electricity system decarbonisation targets compatible
with the UK's Climate Change Act (2008), would require up to
d32bn of investment in distribution assets by 2020 (Ofgem,
2010a). Some recent scholarship has analysed the costs and
beneﬁts of individual “smart” investments (De Castro and Dutra,
2013; Faruqui et al., 2010; Jackson, 2011); yet many of these
approaches analyse only those economic values that can be
captured by the utility deploying the technology. As such the
“beneﬁt” element of the cost beneﬁt analysis for smart grid
investment, is bound to those revenues which accrue to the
investing utility (Giordano et al., 2012). However, there are
geographically speciﬁc values that accrue to non-traditional actors
from smart grid deployment. In this paper, we argue these values
could be captured under different business models for smart grid
investment. We demonstrate the wider beneﬁts of smart grid
investments by examining the local economic development ben-
eﬁts that can accrue to city-regions. We draw on two literatures to
describe the current mismatch between traditional and alternative
valuations of the smart grid. These are socio-technical transitions
literatures, and urban political economy. Bringing these two
literatures together with empirical evidence from interviews and
focus groups, we show how new business models for smart grid
investment can be proposed with a greater role for municipal
governance.
This paper is structured as follows: Section 1.1 describes the
emergence of a co-evolutionary understanding of large system
change. We link this to the need for an understanding of urban
political economy to underpin our analysis, given a new interest in
energy infrastructure at the city-regional scale. This leads to our
research questions. Section 2 sets out the methodology for the
study. Section 3 begins with a description of the traditional
appropriation of value for UK smart grid investments, followed
by substantive analysis of the economic values that smart grids
confer on cities. We then propose a new reading of the smart grid
investment problem, and utilise this analysis to extend our under-
standings of value in the smart grid. We conclude with policy
implications and by arguing that urban economic development
resources may ﬁnd smart grid infrastructures productive avenues
for investment.
1.1. Co-evolution of technical and social elements in the UK's
distribution infrastructure
The liberalisation and privatisation of the UK energy system led to
competitive markets being created for generation and supply whilst
transmission and distribution functions were moved to a regulated
approach (Bolton and Foxon, 2013). The complexity and intercon-
nectedness of these liberalised energy systems has led to a broad
acceptance that they exhibit traits of “large technical systems” in that
they are complex, heterogeneous systems consisting of physical
assets such as machinery, ICT, and the built environment, alongside
non-physical artefacts such as companies, regulations, investors,
societal practices and politics; each of which are interdependent
(Hughes, 1983; Joerges, 1998; Geels, 2006). Socio-technical transi-
tions approaches describe these large technical systems as multi-
layered interactions between socio-technical landscapes, regimes
and niches (Verbong and Geels (2010); Geels, 2004). A further
literature on technical innovation systems is typically focussed on
individual innovations and the processes by which they evolve
within particular social and economic contexts (Hekkert et al.,
2007; Bergek et al., 2007). Innovation approaches describe how
technologies and practices can exhibit parallels to biological evolu-
tion such as variation, selection and retention. Both approaches are
complementary (Markard and Truffer, 2008; Foxon, 2011) and allow
researchers to characterise complexity in large systems and theorise
ways to manage system transitions that are more compatible with
sustainable futures (Kemp and Rotmans, 2005). Foxon (2011) incor-
porates these approaches with evolutionary approaches to economic
change, to propose a “co-evolutionary” framework for analysing a
transition to a low carbon economy; this approach “seeks to identify
causal interactions between evolving systems” (Foxon, 2011, p. 70).
These “systems”, (technologies, institutions, user practices, ecosys-
tems and business strategies) co-evolve to produce particular system
trajectories that are more or less aligned with low carbon futures.
Co-evolution operates on the basic ecological premise that two or
more populations of entities can inﬂuence each other's evolution
(Murmann, 2003, 2013; Norgaard, 1994). As such Foxon (2011)
follows Nelson and Winter (1982) and Freeman and Louca (2001),
describing these systems as subject to their own internal evolution-
ary dynamics, but as also being affected by evolutionary dynamics in
the related systems. These elements of the system co-evolve because
they have signiﬁcant causal impact on each other's ability to persist
(Murmann, 2003; Foxon, 2011). As such, studying these interactions
and co-evolutionary processes in infrastructure systems such as
electricity distribution, can facilitate a deeper understanding of the
actual processes that lead to change, offering a greater chance of
successfully orienting these systems towards low carbon futures.
Recently co-evolutionary approaches have described elements
of the energy system. Bolton and Foxon (2013) analyse the co-
evolution of energy distribution regulation in the UK, with the
business strategies of distributed energy schemes. They ﬁnd that a
regulatory imperative, consumers' legal right to switch supplier,
constrains the deployment of both individual schemes and aggre-
gated low carbon generation options (Bolton and Foxon 2013).
Hannon et al. (2013) analyse the co-evolution of UK electricity
supply business models, investigating both traditional utilities and
energy service companies (ESCos). Rather than relying on a
business model based on distant consumer relations and kWh
unit volume, ESCos build close consumer relations and offer ﬁnal
energy services for predeﬁned prices, drawing revenue streams
from energy savings. Focussing on supplier business models
demonstrates the susceptibility of the energy system to narrow
conceptions of energy value. Giordano and Fulli (2012) propose
that amended business models for distribution operators and
system aggregators could be enabled by smart meters and electric
vehicles, and may alter the value capture opportunities in the
whole system. They conclude by calling for further research to
“capture the disruptive value of new business models and plat-
forms” (Giordano and Fulli, 2012, p. 258). We follow this call by
analysing the co-evolution of business model elements of the UK
distribution system with institutions at the urban scale, to exam-
ine how this may yield new ways of thinking about “values in the
smart grid” and how to capture them.
The importance of identifying different business models for
infrastructure delivery has been highlighted in the UK Govern-
ments National Infrastructure Plan (HM Treasury, 2013). This
research directly supports this search, forming part of the iBUILD1
(Infrastructure Business models, valuation and Innovation for Local
Delivery) project (HM Treasury, 2013, p. 98); iBUILD focuses on the
city and city-regional scale of infrastructure delivery. Infrastruc-
ture business models in particular differ from those associated
with the delivery of products and services due to high capital
barriers to entry, the difﬁculties of excludability, their tendency
toward natural monopoly, and the complexities of value capture in
infrastructure delivery (Bryson et al., 2014). Whilst we recognise
the utility of detailing the speciﬁc attributes of business models in
particular parts of the system after Hannon et al. (2013); we see
the need for a deﬁnition of infrastructure business models. We
follow Bryson et al. (2014) in deﬁning these as “The system of
1 See https://research.ncl.ac.uk/ibuild/.
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physical artefacts, agents, inputs, activities and outcomes that aim
to create, deliver and capture economic, social and environmental
values over the whole infrastructure life cycle” (op cit p. 7).
Our focus on local business models, leads us away from a purely
socio-technical analysis, as these approaches have hitherto under-
theorised the role of space/place in system transitions (Monstadt,
2009; Hodson and Marvin, 2010). Recent contributions have begun
exploring links between socio-technical approaches and urban
political economy (Hodson and Marvin, 2010; Bolton and Foxon,
2013). We therefore draw equally on urban political economy to
analyse the urban or “local” making and remaking of energy
infrastructures.
1.2. Cities and entrepreneurial infrastructures
The Localism programme of the UK's Coalition Government has
placed the responsibility for elements of infrastructure delivery in
the hands of city-regions. This is particularly evident in the suite of
City Deals agreed with England's city-regions and Local Enterprise
Partnerships (LEPs) throughout 2012–13; the majority of which
exhibit strong ambitions for localising ﬁnancial and governance
aspects of infrastructure delivery (HM Government, 2012; Hildreth
and Bailey, 2013). The City Deals are one element of a wider
programme of infrastructure localisation, which is being linked
strongly to the conditions for economic recovery (Heseltine, 2012;
HM Government, 2013). At the local level, a partnership of
England's eight largest cities outside London has signalled their
intent to offer energy supply services, build institutional relation-
ships with distribution network operators (DNO's), eliminate tariff
discrepancies and proliferate embedded energy generation busi-
nesses (Core Cities, 2013). Similarly, the Greater London Authority
is seeking a new form of supply licence to reduce regulatory and
institutional barriers to RE schemes, as identiﬁed by Bolton and
Foxon (2013). This “licence lite” is cited as a step towards the
ambition of the Mayor of London to source 25% of London's energy
locally by 2025 (GLA, 2013). These movements form part of a
wider urban concern, wherein some cities are beginning to see
climate governance as a strategic economic opportunity as well as
an environmental imperative (Bulkeley and Betsill, 2013; While et
al., 2010).
In a seminal piece on the role of cities in global economy,
Harvey (1989) described a shift in the governing logics of cities
from “Managerialism” to “Entrepreneurialism”. The central con-
tention of this work was that local governments, bereft of the
relatively steady employment conditions of Keynesian stimulus
and Fordist production systems, are driven by the need to retain
local business and attract new ﬁrms by deploying the resources of
the local state to make their particular place attractive to mobile
capital (also Altshuler and Luberoff, 2003). Cities achieve this by
differentiating themselves via packages of tax relief, place market-
ing, sectoral specialisation, and critically for our analysis, infra-
structural assemblages (Graham and Marvin, 2001). How urban
entrepreneurialism manifests in urban political economy is under-
stood in a number of ways by critical urban theory (MacLeod and
Goodwin, 1999). Of most utility to this study is the “city as a
growth machine” theory, which explains the construction and
behaviour of particular constellations of actors and institutions
with stakes in the economic fortunes of a given area. The city as a
“growth machine” approach is based on the seminal works of
Molotch (1976). Molotch's (1976) contention was that “growth
coalitions” are formed by groups of land owners/developers and
the local state, as both have much to gain from land use
intensiﬁcation in a given territory. Whilst the original growth
machine theory has received close critical scrutiny (Jonas and
Wilson, 1999), it continues to be usefully employed by scholars
seeking to uncover the causal mechanics of urban phenomena,
particularly with regard to local agency in developing urban
infrastructures (Kirkpatrick and Smith, 2011; Jones, 2001). For
other urban scholars the primacy of land based interests is less
critical. Lauria (1997) argues that Urban Regime Theory, as
formulated by Stone (1989), and Elkin (1987) can address how
different stakeholders in cities emerge around growth interests
and municipal governance. Urban regime theory explains urban
politics by focussing on how collective decisions about urban
development arise. These approaches describe how urban regimes
often solidify around inward investment imperatives as opposed
to redistributive interests. Whilst these approaches are theoreti-
cally distinct, they have been deﬁned under the umbrella term of
New Urban Politics (Cox, 1993; MacLeod and Goodwin, 1999; Jonas
et al., 2010). This approach can be usefully deployed to understand
the agency and strategies of growth actors in particular territories.
This identiﬁes a demonstrable group of urban actors that seek to
inﬂuence the deployment of state resources at different levels to
secure competitive advantages for their neighbourhood, city or
region. These actors have been variously described as growth
coalitions, growth regimes and local economic development net-
works. Here we use “growth coalitions” from the growth machine
approach, which foregrounds land use intensiﬁcation as a key
enabler of urban growth. It is land use intensiﬁcation and
associated pressures on electricity grids that the following analysis
demonstrates may be addressed via smart grid development.
The growth machine approach has recently been used to
understand how urban elites mobilise to ensure urban growth
can be sustained in contemporary capitalist cities under state-
induced conditions of ﬁscal austerity (Hall and Jonas, 2014;
Kirkpatrick and Smith, 2011). A particular focus is on the mechan-
isms through which urban infrastructure is ﬁnanced in order to
revive growth trajectories (Ward and Jonas, 2004; Davidson and
Ward, 2014; Jonas et al., 2010). This begs the question as to what
role infrastructure provision can play in facilitating urban compe-
titiveness and who beneﬁts from realising it.
Cox and Wood (1997) explain how the structure of energy
utilities in the US draws them into local growth politics. In many
states and jurisdictions, utilities serve territories as monopolies. It
is therefore in the interest of a utility working on a “units of energy
sold” business model to ensure residents, commerce, and industry
remain within or are attracted to a particular locality. The utilities
are to a degree locally dependent (Cox and Mair, 1988) in that their
proﬁts are tied to place. The primary role of utilities in Cox and
Wood's (1997) analysis demonstrates the importance or energy
infrastructure networks to ﬁrms looking to relocate, and how the
political economy of energy infrastructure can be implicated in
wider local economic development networks.
However, in the UK, privatised and mainly multi-national
energy utilities operate within a liberalised energy market that is
nationally regulated (Bolton and Foxon, 2013). Hence, both gen-
eration and supply actors in the electricity system have little or no
incentive to participate in local growth activities; securing local
growth in a particular place is not incentivised by their “business
model” (Hannon et al., 2013); as such they lack local dependence
(Cox and Mair, 1988). However, this is not the case for other types
of infrastructure such as rail transport (Peters, 2009), toll roads
(Torrance, 2008), ports (Daamen and Vries, 2013) or communica-
tions (Rutherford, 2005). The acceleration of high speed broad-
band into local enterprise zones may be seen as an attempt to
leverage infrastructure networks as an enabler of urban place
based competition for inward investment (HM Treasury, 2011).
What has been lacking to date in the UK is an understanding of the
values that smart grid infrastructures deliver at the urban scale.
We investigate whether smart infrastructure has the potential to
facilitate inward investment, unlock sites for development,
increase local energy schemes and increase the local tax base.
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This analysis combines insights from the socio-technical transi-
tions and New Urban Politics literatures, in order to demonstrate
how these values may be realised by local actors; this enables a
broader appreciation of the role of space in infrastructure innova-
tion and transitions. It is particularly apposite to do so now, as a
number of studies have begun to analyse the circuits of value
incorporated in the energy system, and how they might be
captured at the local scale. Gouldson et al. (2012) show that 10%
of GVA “leaks” out of the Leeds City Region economy to pay the
energy bill. Sherwood and Tompt (2013) investigate biomass and
solar generation in Herefordshire. They ﬁnd d909 m of investment
opportunity and potential for d130 m/year local revenues. Impor-
tantly Sherwood and Tompt (2013) note that there remains “the
shadow of whether the existing electrical distribution grid in and
around Herefordshire would need substantial development before
it could cope with local generation of electricity on the scale
envisaged” (Sherwood and Tompt, 2013, p. 36). Further studies
have analysed the economic advantages that might induce muni-
cipalities to pursue expanded renewables generation such as local
employment, reduced future costs of electricity and increased
local tax bases (Busch and McCormick, 2014; Heinbach et al.,
2014). Whilst many of these studies focus on the proliferation of
renewable energy (RE) schemes, the transition to a smart grid is a
crucial factor. In order to capture these beneﬁts, a compatible grid
infrastructure must exist.
The socio technical systems literature helps us to understand
institutions and business models within the national energy
system, whilst urban political economy approaches inform us as
to why speciﬁc constellations of urban actors form coalitions and
how they leverage infrastructure investment to promote urban
growth. Combining the two enables us to address the questions:
what local values are created by transitioning the socio-technical
system of electricity distribution to “smart” status? And: what
institutional structures and business models can be constructed
that capture these values given their attractiveness to local growth
coalitions?
2. Methods
These research questions rely on value judgements by stake-
holders. As such we utilise a qualitative research design, combin-
ing secondary documentary analysis of policy and regulatory
literatures with substantive primary research comprising in depth
semi-structured interviews and focus groups. We adopted a
purposive sampling technique utilising snowball selection. Inter-
viewees were selected that had speciﬁc interests in either the
distribution network or smart grid, local energy related economic
development issues or both. We undertook 3 focus groups and 10
interviews with 17 individuals from across the electricity genera-
tion, distribution and regulation sector, alongside municipal sta-
keholders drawn from across the UK (focussing on Northern
England). This included 2 regulatory professionals, 2 project devel-
opers, 5 “local growth actors” from municipalities or economic
development organisations with an interest in local energy, and
8 distribution network or smart metering professionals. Interviews
and focus groups were undertaken both face to face and over the
telephone. Interview transcripts were analysed using NVivo to
extract themes of value capture and retention from smart grid
technologies. We follow Hodson and Marvin (2012) who used a
combined approach of documentary analysis and in-depth inter-
viewing as a good methodological ﬁt for undertaking research at
the intersection of socio-technical transitions and urban political
economy. The substantive element of our NVivo analysis aimed to
categorise values that smart grid investments confer on the
municipal scale. For the purposes of this analysis we class the
municipal scale as that which comprises both local authorities and
their wider economic development territories such as those
described by Local Enterprise Partnership (LEP) areas.
3. Results and discussion: values in the smart grid
This section is constructed in three parts. Firstly, we describe
how value is traditionally measured and captured in smart grid
investments. Secondly, economic values arising from smart grid
investments at the municipal scale are analysed. Finally, we
describe how new value capture opportunities can reduce the
ﬁnancial risks of smart grid deployment.
3.1. Traditional value in the smart grid
The initial regulation of the privatised UK energy distribution
system relied on price incentives to drive efﬁciency, maintenance
and asset renewal. The “RPI-X” formula was the mechanism used
under the distribution price control reviews (DPCRs) to set allow-
able revenues for the seven Distribution Network Operators
(DNOs). The DPCRs ran for ﬁve years each, with the DPCR 5 period,
covering 2010–2015, the last to use “RPI-X” mechanism (Ofgem,
2010b). “RPI-X” caps price increases to the distribution use of
system charge (DUoS), the predominant revenue stream of DNO's
levied on consumer bills. The DUoS charge cap is based on the rate
of inﬂation deﬁned by the Retail Prices Index minus a factor “X”
(hence, “RPI –X”). “X” is a function of the capital and operational
expenditure (CAPEX and OPEX respectively) of the DNO. For the
OPEX element, DNO's are incentivised by benchmarking against
the best practice DNOs in the sector. For CAPEX, the assessed value
of the asset base, plus investment, minus depreciation equals the
asset value. DNOs earn an allowed rate of return on these assets
based a weighted average cost of capital (WACC). Together with
separately calculated service incentives, this represents the rev-
enue structure of the UK's regulated distribution business model.
Due to new duties placed on the regulator (the Ofﬁce of Gas and
Electricity Markets, “Ofgem”) to take account of factors other than
cost, such as climate change targets, fuel poverty and security of
supply (Xenias et al., 2014), the RPI-X mechanism has been
described as unﬁt for purpose. This is based on the grounds that
it incentivises incremental efﬁciency gains over system innovation,
and so fails to deliver environmental and social beneﬁts (Müller,
2011). In order to incentivise a “timely delivery of a sustainable
energy sector” (Ofgem, 2010b, p. 4), RPI-X has been replaced by
the RIIO (Revenue¼ Incentivesþ InnovationþOutput) framework
for the price control review currently being negotiated, which will
cover the period 2015–2023 (Ofgem, 2010b; Müller, 2011). The
RIIO framework is a signiﬁcant shift towards an allowable reven-
ues structure that better incentivises smart grid solutions. Space
constrains a detailed assessment of the RIIO incentives (see Xenias
et al., 2014; Müller, 2011; Ofgem, 2010b). What is important to our
analysis is the reaction of the DNOs to RIIO, and the question as to
whether the new price framework is expected to incentivise
enough investment in smart grids to accommodate the volume
of renewables necessary to meet decarbonisation goals. Our DNO
respondents broadly understood the move to RIIO as positive for
smart grid investments:
“The key game changer with RIIO is actually we get told we
have to ﬁx our problems, so we have problem areas where we can
ﬁx them traditionally but we could also ﬁx them with innovation
[smart grid technologies]. So it [RIIO] doesn't specify that you have
to install so many cables, so many overhead lines so many
transformers. It just tells you, you have to ﬁx the problem. That
really opens up the opportunity for us to use innovation in that
way” (DNO interviewee, 2014).
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RIIO allows smart grid technologies to be assessed alongside
conventional reinforcement solutions, which is more in line with a
commercial logic of technology deployment on a cost basis as
opposed to constraining activities to those that meet regulatory
standards. Whether this will be enough to incentivise sufﬁcient
grid infrastructure investment to accommodate the necessary
renewable capacity to meet climate change targets was described
as the “million dollar question” by one DNO respondent. Across the
DNO sample, there was deep uncertainty as to the ability of the
new framework to incentivise sufﬁcient innovation to manage the
volume of RE compatible with the UK's emissions reductions
targets.
This brings smart grid investment decisions in the UK closer to
what Jackson (2011) describes as the “smart grid investment
problem” (Fig. 1) where the aggregated beneﬁts of smart grid
technology deployment deﬁne the likelihood of smart invest-
ments. Yet, whereas Jackson (2011) includes remote meter reading
and demand side management (DSR), these are un-captured
values for DNOs due to the structure of the UK energy market
(see below).
nThese values are illustrative only and deﬁne the problem, they
do not relate to the relative value of each beneﬁt.
The “risk” element of Fig. 1 in a UK context is notionally
complicated by the strength of the regulatory incentive, yet
Fig. 1 still holds as a sufﬁcient description of the problem. Clearly,
if further values exist and can be leveraged, the volume of the risk
arrow will reduce. What values are there in smart-grid transitions
that are not captured by the investing utilities, and which actors
might be interested in appropriating them?
Bialek and Taylor (2010) describe a “broken value chain” in the
smart grid. Houseman (2008) demonstrates the disaggregation of
vertically integrated utilities also disaggregates the ability to
capture value from speciﬁc smart grid investments. Xenias et al.
(2014) describe the “value chain” in the smart grid to comprise
familiar market participants who may be further enabled by smart
technology deployment. Certainly it is important to begin to
research business models to enable smart infrastructures from
within the existing sector (see Agrell et al., 2013); here however
we are concerned with the values accruing to non-traditional
actors, i.e. growth coalitions/municipalities. We see the rhetoric on
Localism, City Deals and the aspirations of several core cities and
municipalities as recognising the ability of smart infrastructures to
unlock growth opportunities.
Currently, potential smart grid values accrue to conventional
and renewable generators, households, SME's, suppliers, metering
companies, and the natural environment. However, these values
are not included in the current cost beneﬁt case for DNO invest-
ments, represented in Fig. 1, i.e. beneﬁts are “mismatched” to costs
due to the institutional and business model regimes in the current
UK system. Whilst values accruing to individual households,
business and industry may be captured by each individual, the
aggregation of these values at the city-regional scale may lead to
signiﬁcant geographical value propositions which go unrecog-
nised. Indeed, in an analysis of the pathways the UK might take
towards the development of smarter grids, Balta-Ozkan et al.
(2014), recognise a clear role for municipalities in a more dis-
tributed energy future. This is a further justiﬁcation for using
Jackson's (2011) framing of the smart grid investment problem, as
Jackson's work was aimed at deﬁning the smart grid investment
problem for municipal utilities in the US, yet it still omitted these
municipal scale values.
3.2. Alternative values in the smart grid
Cities are no strangers to speculative infrastructure spending to
secure inward investment. As described in our literature review
above, acting to secure inward investment by utilising infrastruc-
tural incentives is a primary activity of growth coalitions; those
individuals, institutions and partnerships with a stake in local
economic growth. In many cases, this leads cities to make infra-
structure investments ahead of need, in order to reduce relocation
costs for ﬁrms and secure mobile investment (Hildreth and Bailey,
2013). Equally, recent treatments of renewable generation values
in municipalities describe the values directly accruing to the
area; these are an increased tax base and employment growth
(Heinbach et al., 2014). Our deﬁnition of municipal value for this
analysis are those economic values which either represent a direct
exchange value (i.e. revenues), such as increased tax bases or
payments for energy services, or indirect values such as territorial
employment growth. This leaves any social and environmental
values uncaptured, which could be addressed by further work.
Below, we analyse three economic values identiﬁed by our sample
that accrue to city-regions through smart grid deployment. These
categories are: (1) renewable energy connection co-ordination;
(2) inward investment stimulus; and (3) municipal supplier load
control.
3.3. Renewable energy connection co-ordination
Currently in the UK, network connections are offered to gene-
ration developers on a ﬁrst come ﬁrst served basis. If there is
capacity on that part of the network to connect the generation, a
connection is paid for by the developer. If there is no capacity on
the network, the developer must pay for network reinforcement
for the scheme to progress:
“What the process has been over the last ten ﬁfteen years is
basically we sort of sit here in a little bubble and wait for somebody
Fig. 1. The smart grid investment problem*. Source: Adapted for the UK from Jackson (2011) p.77.
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to come to us and say “we would like to build a generator here”. We
go “yep okay it's going to cost X amount” ”(DNO interviewee, 2013).
Our DNO stakeholders identiﬁed several schemes where inno-
vative connection agreements, which avoid or postpone grid
reinforcement, are being offered through the innovation funding
incentives already available (e.g., SPEN, 2013; SSE, 2012). They also
cited the RIIO framework as further incentivising innovative
connection agreements to bring more renewables onto the net-
work without resorting to traditional reinforcement (see Anaya
and Pollitt, 2013). What has been absent thus far has been a co-
ordinated approach where proximate developers looking to
deploy generation capacity in similar timeframes have been
aggregated to facilitate expanded use of these new connection
business models:
“…if somebody was taking the lead on co-ordination, because
often what we ﬁnd is if there's three organisations looking to
connect to the same part of a network and if they all got together
there would be a sensible and economic solution that met all their
requirements, but trying to get those three parties to work
together….” (DNO Interviewee, 2013).
If a municipality were to co-ordinate the points at which new
generation developers contact the DNO, more innovative connection
agreements could be offered and thus an area may attract more
developers. As Heinbach et al. (2014) show, increased tax bases and
employment beneﬁts can accrue to municipalities arising from
renewable developers (also Busch and McCormick, 2014). Our muni-
cipal interviewees saw the value of increased local renewable gen-
eration schemes to municipalities, and described actors in a growth
coalition (the LEP in this case), as being active in seeking them:
“So to date local authorities, the way they thought about
renewable energy has tended to be, it's been about as a regulator,
they have come at it very much from a planning side of things [...]
Since the LEP's come along there has been a lot more momentum
to sort of act more like a project sponsor I suppose, to start ﬁnding
opportunities for renewable energy and be a lot more bullish
about getting funding for those and getting investment in” (Local
growth actor Interview, 2012).
The same respondent referred to developing a “pipeline” of
renewable energy schemes in the area to enable further inward
investment. There is an identiﬁable value for municipalities to
manage “tranches” of generators utilising their resources in
spatial planning to co-ordinate developer connections. This would
increase the attractiveness of the city-region/territory for RE
developers due to lower grid connection costs and thus capture
the tax and employment values RE can bring to the municipal area.
Though one should note the business rates from RE schemes
would currently be nationally pooled, the announcement from the
UK Government that rates from hydraulic fracturing (fracking)
operations may be retained by municipalities, demonstrates the
feasibility of allowing energy scheme rates to be retained at the
local level (Sandford, 2014).
The ﬁrst new value stream identiﬁed by this analysis is the
enhanced investment in local renewable energy schemes in these
areas, and the tax and employment beneﬁts directly generated by
those installations. These beneﬁts are enabled by new connection
business models, which allow DNOs to connect more RE schemes in
a given territory without expensive traditional reinforcement. Due to
regulatory constraints on DNOs, it is commercially difﬁcult for them
to co-ordinate or “aggregate” RE developer connections. Municipal
actors, on the other hand, can perform this role and thus capture the
beneﬁts of expanded generation business location.
3.4. Inward investment stimulus
Whilst new RE schemes can bring direct economic beneﬁts
to municipalities, the capacity of the distribution network can
constrain or enable inward investment from other sectors. The
following is an extended quote from a municipal respondent that
clearly describes a real world example:
“Ok this is a very simple example. Out at [local enterprise zone
name] as part of the City Deal we obtained any business rates
growth that we drive in there, we retain 100% of it within the city.
That is a colossal area but it is absolutely constrained on the DNO
network. So we have got three supply points into that area from
the 132 kV step downs to the 32 kV network. Two of them are
completely full up and one of them is getting very close to
capacity. So that is going to be a massive constraint upon our
building out in that area, or there is going to have to be some
upgrade to those supply points so we can actually take on more
electricity and actually build out on that area, and it is also the area
where we can put the most generation on as well [...]. So we are
looking at that and saying this is going to be a constraint issue for
us. [...] so effectively what we want to do is we want to come in
there now and say we will put a distribution network in and that
might free up avoided cost of what they [Incumbent DNO] would
need to do on their network. Off the back of that is there some
different type of relationship where we can actually do trading
between us and [DNO name] in terms of those avoided costs and
actually the electricity across the networks” (Local growth actor
interview, 2014).
In this case, a local growth actor recognised the constraint on
the DNO network can be alleviated by municipal investment in
smart grid solutions. Other municipal respondents were equally
aware of the potential to use smart solutions to free up capacity in
designated development zones. This leads to value stream 2:
additional inward investment enabled by smart grid investments
from economic development funds. Similar to value stream 1,
values are captured in tax base increases and employment growth,
but from investment enabled in sectors beyond energy generation.
3.5. Municipal supply and demand response
The two value streams above are on the “supply side” of
beneﬁts of the smart grid. On the demand side, reducing consumer
loads can also facilitate increased investment and renewables
connection through load control (not to mention aggregated
household savings). DNO stakeholders described why the UK's
smart meter roll out being delivered by energy suppliers (HM
Government 2013a) means the DNOs will not have direct access to
demand side response (DSR), i.e. real-time management of elec-
tricity demand. This disables a key smart grid beneﬁt (Jackson,
2011). There are three reasons smart meters rolled out by energy
suppliers (the company to whom customers pay the bill) disables
DSR in the UK. Firstly, as energy suppliers do not own distribution
networks, the company receiving meter data has no link to DNOs.
Secondly, suppliers operate nationally and have no geographic
focus, customers in a given area receive the meters ad hoc; this
means only a small percentage of households or businesses would
be reachable by tariff based load constraint:
We have no access to load control via smart meters. [..] given
that we probably won't have majority penetration of smart meters
into GB until probably 2018–2019, using DSR in anger is probably a
few years away” (DNO Interviewee, 2014).
Thirdly, our DNO sample did not see the large, incumbent
suppliers as being interested in partnership business models to
operate DSR, which is partially based on the second point of
geographic mismatch between national supplier and localised load
constraints.
If, however, a municipal scale, geographically focussed supplier
held substantive percentages of demand in an area, and had access
to load control themselves (being the supplier they would own the
smart meter), DNO's would be able to contract with this local load
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management and deliver the demand side beneﬁts of smart grid
deployment:
“…there would be nothing stopping a group of houses or a
group of businesses all signing up to the same supplier [...] and the
supplier coming to us and saying right, rather than adding another
transformer how about we offer you demand side reduction and
we would be interested in taking that off them so we wouldn't
have to do reinforcement” (DNO interviewee, 2014).
Indeed, one DNO had already investigated the option of directly
contracting commercial customers for load control but also
described the beneﬁts of aggregated business models based on
geographically deﬁned supply contracts:
“We have also explored the model of us directly engaging and
signing up customers and also working with aggregators who will
also sign up customers, and we engage with an aggregator […] At
the moment there isn't any organisation that we are aware of that
has thousands of customers aggregated in one geographic area.”
Interviewer. “Which there would be is there was a city scale
energy supplier?”
“Absolutely yes but at the moment it's not currently there to be
trialled” (DNO interviewee, 2014).
However, the Core Cities group has stated the intention of its
eight constituent municipalities to set up energy supply compa-
nies by 2020 (Core Cities, 2013). A local authority ofﬁcer respon-
dent close to this process signalled the intention to go “smart from
the start”, installing smart meters for each new customer from the
beginning of the programme. The inherent close geographical
focus of a municipal supplier, means the problems of supply tariffs
being owned by large national utilities who may be unwilling or
unable to engage at neighbourhood level with DNOs, would
eliminated by a municipal supplier business model. As such,
demand side response contracts could be negotiated with muni-
cipal suppliers. Once customer connection in a given area are high
enough, DNOs would be willing to pay for demand side response.
This leads to value stream 3, automated demand side response
(DSR), which is a traditional component of smart grid cost beneﬁt
analysis that is disabled in the UK by the political and institutional
choices associated with the smart meter roll out. As we have
shown, this can be overcome to some extent with municipal scale
supply contracts.
3.6. Smart grids as smart urban infrastructure investments
The above analysis has identiﬁed three smart grid enabled
economic value streams that accrue to municipal actors that have
hitherto been unrecognised in the UK's smart grid investment
calculus. Mechanisms for value capture here are already being
explored. Business rate retention in enterprise zones in particular
represents a demonstrable ﬁscal value stream which accrues to
host municipalities. Investing in infrastructure ahead of these
values is a recognised feature of economic development activity.
Recently, Greater Manchester has agreed a “revolving infrastruc-
ture fund” with d150 m retained business rate revenues (GMCA,
2012). Shefﬁeld, Newcastle and Gateshead, and Nottingham have
secured powers to raise a combined total of d133 m for speculative
infrastructure investment to secure growth (Sandford, 2013).
Much of these revenues are often directed towards transport
investment as transport networks are the responsibility of the
municipalities, whilst energy networks are not. Our research
suggests that there is no functional reason why municipal infra-
structure funds cannot be deployed for smart grid infrastructure.
Whilst rate retention is a direct economic value stream, the
employment beneﬁts identiﬁed in the smart grid are indirect, but
can equally be paid for by economic development funds. Leeds
City Region, for example, is aiming to raise almost d1.5bn over the
next ten years to fund transport and economic infrastructure with
no prospect of recouping the cost directly. This is because the
promoters of the new transport fund, which forms a cogent
growth coalition in Leeds, believe the combined schemes will lead
to 20,000þ jobs in their geographic area (LCRP, 2013).
The volume of capital that growth coalitions are willing to
deploy to secure infrastructure aimed at facilitating growth is
substantial. This research has characterised just three clear muni-
cipal economic values not currently captured in the RIIO frame-
work or in the smart grid investment literature. Supply side
constraints on multiplying RE generators and stimulating inward
investment can be reduced by using economic development funds
to pay for developer co-ordination and stimulus monies can be
channelled to “hard” technology investments in partnership with
DNOs. On the demand side, municipal energy supply companies
deploying smart meters would enable meaningful demand
response contracts to be negotiated with DNOs, both realising
the technical beneﬁts of load control and strengthening the
economic case for municipal supply companies. This may also
facilitate value streams 1 and 2 as demand side response may
further release capacity on the network for RE schemes or for land
use intensiﬁcation. We can thus amend the smart grid investment
problem (Fig. 1) by paying attention to these values, and the
business models and institutional structures that might capture
them in Fig. 2.
nThese values are illustrative only and deﬁne the problem, they
do not relate to the relative value of each beneﬁt.
Fig. 2. The smart grid investment problem taking account of municipal economic value returns*.
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By including these municipal value streams in the smart grid
investment problem, risk is reduced. With a reduced risk proposi-
tion, the cost of project capital may also be lower, further
enhancing the viability of a given smart investment.
3.7. The combined approach – co-evolving smart grid value capture
To capture all the beneﬁts of these municipal values, new
institutions and business models will be required. DNOs will need
to demonstrate the characteristics of more active distribution
system operators (DSOs) which utilise smart grid investments to
operate an active power system (Openshaw, 2012):
“I think that's kind of part of the evolution to us becoming a
DSO, is to be able to engage in those sort of relationships [...] It's
not the technology and the smart grid stuff because that's... I
refrain from saying easy but that’s sort of a known quantity, we
know how to do that, it’s the business models and the contractual
relationships between people that throw up the shaky ground I
think” (DNO Interviewee, 2014, our emphasis).
One particular enabling business model for each of the values
identiﬁed above would be a municipal (i.e. city scale) supply
company. This could take the form of a traditional supply company
or may adopt an ESCo model (Hannon et al., 2013). A municipal
supply company can further aggregate RE developers by offering
attractive power purchase agreements (PPAs) to RE developers
and it can achieve the aforementioned geographic DSR. By com-
bining the beneﬁts of a municipal supplier at the city scale, a
strong case for economic development funds to be applied to
smart grid infrastructure can be made. Indeed this combined
structure is the very aspiration of one of our local growth actors
in the municipal energy space:
“…what we are looking to do here in [city name] is to use our
purchasing power to enter into PPA agreements with community
groups who want to install small scale generation, turbines, tidal,
wind, stuff like that. We would be able to do some deals with our
energy from waste plant, we would be able to get into that whole
area where we can sort of drive sustainable and local low carbon
energy zones to drive economic growth in that area” (Local growth
actor interview, 2014).
Combining the municipal values in the smart grid under
municipal energy supplier business model is, we argue, one way
to accelerate smart grid investments. Growth regimes in various
cities have assembled substantial infrastructure funds, economic
partnership institutions and value capture mechanisms that could
be applied to smart grid investments. Their increasing interest in
energy infrastructure makes this analysis timely, as characterising
these ﬁscal and economic values is the ﬁrst step toward quanti-
tative evaluations.
4. Conclusions and policy implications
There are clear policy implications from this research. Firstly, to
capture RE developer co-ordination values, the economic develop-
ment strategies of municipalities should begin to treat electricity
grids as enablers of economic growth just as they do transport and
communications infrastructures. As a ﬁrst step, local authorities
should collate the planning applications within the development
control process and invite expressions of interest from proximate
developers for a non-ﬁrm (interruptible) connections offer to be
extended to their incumbent DNO. Secondly, as has already been
intimated by Core Cities (2013), a more structured role for munici-
palities within DNO network planning is needed. This would mean
better co-ordination of the economic plans of Local Enterprise
Partnerships and the spatial plans of Local Authorities, with the
knowledge of geographic network constraints at DNO level. The
opportunity for local authorities to capture business rate uplifts
from renewable generators should be extended in the same way as
proposals for fracking sites have been. This would ensure munici-
palities capture value from, as well bear the impacts of, renewable
energy developments. To capture the values of inward investment
stimulus, the economic development funds being assembled by
LEPs, and their associated value capture models of Tax Increment
Finance and “Earnback” (Sandford, 2013), should be extended in
scope to incorporate smart grid investments. Most of these new
funds have an overwhelming transport infrastructure focus (by
capital value), and should be encouraged by national actors such as
Ofgem and DECC to search for other infrastructural opportunities,
such as releasing growth capacities on constrained sites by smart
grid interventions. Together with the new pricing framework under
RIIO, this would be a substantial boost to the volume of capital
available for smart innovation. Finally, the ability to capture values
from demand response, enabled by the municipal supplier business
models, needs further development. This suggests that municipal
supplier companies could bring back demand side response as a
value in the smart grid investment problem for the UK. The ﬁrst
step towards realising this would be for the RIIO innovation funds
and LEP economic development funds to search for candidate sites
where this latent business model can be applied. However, this
business model raises fundamental challenges for the current UK
political and institutional model of competitive markets for energy
supply, which are based on customers being able to switch
suppliers to reduce the unit price of their electricity supply. To be
commercially viable, a municipal supply company would need to
have a secure customer base within the region.
This analysis has shown that, by combining the insights from
socio-technical transitions and urban political economy framings,
it is possible to demonstrate how values in the smart grid can be
captured by urban growth interests using new business models at
the municipal scale. The increasing focus on infrastructural
enablers of growth at the local level is permeating into the
economic strategies of urban governance. For the UK energy
system, growth coalitions (formalised in LEPs) are becoming a
more signiﬁcant part of the institutional system, as they begin to
focus on the beneﬁts smart technologies can bring. It follows that
the technological and institutional elements of the system are co-
evolving with new actors in the institutional space, as described
Foxon's (2011) co-evolutionary framework. Smart grid technolo-
gies facilitate new ways of thinking about the values of urban
infrastructure; driving a search for new business models. The role
of urban space, and how the governance of that space interacts
with infrastructure systems, is critical to understanding the types
of agency in different infrastructural contexts.
This analysis has highlighted three additional economic values
that accrue to city-regions through smart grid deployment:
(1) renewable energy connections co-ordination; (2) inward
investment stimulus; and (3) municipal supplier load control. This
is not a comprehensive list, which would need to incorporate
social or environmental values of smart grid investment, and
describe the wider values of municipal participation in energy
services. However, that by analysing stakeholder values from the
currently separate communities of DNOs/Regulators and munici-
palities/growth coalitions, we have identiﬁed value propositions
that have hitherto gone unrecognised in the UK's version of the
smart grid investment problem.
Further work will investigate the creation of relevant business
models in an empirical setting. Following the insights above,
future research will use case approaches to undertake quantitative
analysis of these economic values, and also social and environ-
mental and wider values. There is also a need for further interna-
tional treatments of energy system transitions, where urban
political economy and energy systems have co-evolved differently
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and may highlight further value streams which may be captured
by novel systems perspectives.
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